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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JAY A. THOMAS, for himself, 
and JESSICA MAY THOMAS, an 
infant, through her guardian, 
JAY A. THOMAS, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant, 
CAROL PAYNE HANSEN, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 14,224 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondent agrees with appellants' statement of the Nature 
of the Case. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT ' 
Respondent agrees with appellants' statement of the 
Disposition in the Lower Court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have the court affirm the lower court's 
judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees with appellants' Statement of the 
Facts. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUMENT ON APPEAL 
Respondeat contends the law in Utah on the Guest Statute 
is a settled matter. The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has 
declared the Guest Statute constitutional and has ruled on both 
points raised by appellants. 
POINT I 
UTAH GUEST STATUTE IS CONSTITUTIONAL AND IS NOT IN VIOLATION 
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
The Utah Court in the case of Cannon v. Oviatt, 520 P, 2d -
883 (Utah, 1974), declared the Guest Statute constitutional, 
said opinion being more fully set forth as follows: 
Jack] CANNON, Plaintiff and Appellant; 
v. 
Paula OVIATT et ah, Defendants 
and Respendent. 
Eugant-W. MARTIN, Guardian ad \\t*m for 
Jackie A* Martin, a minor, Plain* 
tiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Jay a JACKSON and Harold a Russell, 
Dsfendants and Respondents. 
Nos. I33S8, 13373. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 2d, 1974 
Separate actions challenging constitu-
tionality of the automobile guest statute. 
The Third District Court, Salt Lake Coun-
ty, G. Hal Taylor and S. Mark Johnson, 
JJ-* upheld the constitutionality of the stat-
ute, and consolidated appeals were taken. 
The Supreme Court, Callister, C J., held 
that automobile guest statute did not deny 
injured guests the equal protection of the 
laws. 
Affirmed. 
Heariod, J-, concurred and filed opio-
ion. 
Crockett, J.# concurred specially and 
filed optmon. 
I.'Atitom«M!ss<S»i3!{J) 
Automobile guest statute was enacted 
to provide some protection to a generous 
host, who is sued by his invited guest for 
ordinary negligence, when the rider has 
given no compensation as an inducement 
for making the trip or furnishing the car-
riage for the rider, to subservice the valid 
legislative purpose of encouraging hospital* 
ity in the use of the public highways. U, 
GA.1953, 41-9-1. 
2. Automobiles <S=>l8l(i) 
Automobile guest is not placed in a 
distinctive classification under automobile 
guest statute, so as to require a finding 
that the automobile guest alone, as a recip-
ient of generosity, is deprived of the duty 
of due care by his host. U.CA.1953, 41-
W. 
3. Atttomefelfee<3»l8l(l) 
Automobile guest statute does not ere* 
ate a distinctive classification for automo* 
bile guests as compared to others insofar 
as collusive lawsuits are concerned U,C 
A.1953* 4 1 - M . 
4. Ceeetltntieeal Law S»2U 
Equal protection clause docs not com*-
pel a state to attack every aspect of a Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
problem or to refrain from any action at 
all; it is sufficient that the states action 
be rationally based and free from invidious 
"•discrimination. Const art. 1, § 24; U.S. 
GA.Cans&. Amend, 14. 
5. Au'{*«««i»M4«.€B»i8ft{!)' 
Co?nii*?ii0i»ai La* «5»243 
Automobile guest statute did not deny 
an injured guest equal protection of the 
laws. U.CA.1953, 41-9-1; Const art 1, § 
24; U.S.CA.Const Amend. 14. 
Anthony M. Thurber, Salt Lake City, 
for Cannon. 
Curtis K. Oberhansley and Stephen W. 
Cook, of Kinghom, Oberhansly & 
O'Connell, Salt lake City, for Martin. 
D. Gary Christian and Stevert H. Gunn, 
of Kipp & Christian, Salt Lake City, for 
Oviatt 
Don J. Hanson, Salt Lake City, for Hel-
sley, Moffat and Moffat 
David E. West, of Armstrong, Rawiings, 
West & Schaerrer, Salt Lake City, for 
Jackson and Russell. * 
CALLISTER, Chief Justice: 
The appeals of the plaintiffs, which 
arose out of separate and unrelated ac-
tions, have been consolidated since they in-
volved one common question of law, name-
ly, was Section 41-9-1, U.GA.1953, un-
constitutional? Each plaintiff, while a 
guest in a motor vehicle, moving upon a 
public highway in this state, sustained per-
sonal injuries in a vehicular accident 
Each plaintiff initiated an action against 
his host, the driver of the vehicle, to re-
cover damages for the negligent operation 
of the vehicle. Each host asserted Section 
41-SM, U.CA, 1953, as a defense and de-
nied liability. Each plaintiff urged unsuc-
cessfully before the trial court that the 
Guest Statute, 41-ft-l, U.CA. 1953, denied 
him equal protection of the law under the 
Constitution of the United States (14th 
Amendment) and the Constitution of Utah 
(Article I, Section 24). 
I. SC*l^afi*l£»CaLBptr.33a>3C«P^d212(iaTl). 
On appeal each plaintiff relies on the 
reasoning set forth in Brown v. Merlo/ 
wherein the Supreme Court of California 
held that the proffijr^i justification for 
that jurisdiction's guest statute did not 
constitute a rational basis for the different 
tial treatment accorded by the statutory 
scheme of classification and wa3 therefore 
a denial of equal protection of the law. 
The Brown decision set forth two distinct 
justifications for. the statute, the protection 
of hospitality and the prevention of collu« 
sive lawsuits. The court found the protect 
tion of hospitality rationale fatally defec-
tive on the grounds: (1) It failed to ex-
plain why the statute accorded differential 
treatment to automobile guests as dhtin* 
guished from other guests* (2) In li.^h: of 
recent developments in comparable legal 
doctrines, the interest in protecting hospi-
tality could not rationally justify the with-
drawal of legal protection from guests. 
(3) It ignored the prevalence of liability 
insurance coverage today, which under-
mines any alleged rational connection be-
tween prevention of lawsuits and the pro-
tection of hospitality. The prevention of 
collusive lawsuits rationale was determined 
defective as overinclusive, since it barred 
valid suits along with the fraudulent" 
claims. The court further found that the 
classification was aggravated by a serie* 
of limiting loopholes, which stayed the op* 
eration of the statute under a variety of 
diverse and illogical circumstances. The 
court explained that the numerous excep-
tions produced an absurd and illogical pat-
tern which eliminated any rationality 
which might conceivably be claimed for the 
statute. 
The California court stated that the stat-
ute established three distinct levels of clas-
sification: (1) The act treated automobile 
guests differently from paying passengers. 
(2) It treated automobile guests differently 
from other social guests and recipients of 
generosity and withdrew from auto guests 
the protection from negligently inflicted 
injuries generally enjoyed by a guest in 
other contexts. (3) The act distinguished 
between subclasses of auto guests, with* 
holding recovery from guests injured while 
"in a vehicle9* "during a ride" "upon a pub* 
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He highway*' but permitted recovery hy the 
guest injured ureter other ci ream stances. 
According to the court, ih<i rationality of 
the tripartite clarification scheme must be 
evaluated in the light of the purposes of 
the legislation. No other case had adjudi-
cated the constitutional issue on this basis. 
The court stated that the hospitality jus-
tification provided an inadequate explana-
tion for the differential treatment accorded 
to automobile guests as distinguished from 
other guests. Under California law, guests 
or recipients of hospitality may generally 
demand that their hosts exercise due care 
so as not to injure them.2 In a footnote3 
the court explained that in 1929> the time 
of enactment, the guest statute had a closer 
relationship to general tort doctrine, since 
at that time property owners owed a duty 
of ordinary care only to invitees (business 
visitors) and owed only some lesser duty 
of care to licensees (social guests). Pres-
ently, in California, the general duty of ordi-
nary care governs a landowner's duty to all 
those injured on his property, social guests 
and business visitors alike. Since the gen-
eral tort doctrine has bsen modified, the 
guest statute singles automobile guests for a 
special burden and thus creates an arbitrary 
and unreasonable classification. The court 
reasoned that no realistic state purpose 
supported the classification scheme of the 
statute, since persons situated with respect 
to the purpose of the law (recipients of 
hospitality) do not receive like treatment 
. The court stated that the statutory pur-
pose of fostering hospitality cannot ration-
ally justify the lowering of protection for 
one class, namely, automobile guests as dis-
tinguished from paying passengers. The 
court rdied on Rowland v. Christian4 and 
stated that just as it was unreasonable to 
lower the standard of care to a visitor on 
private property because he was a'social 
guest rather than a "paying" invitee, it was 
unreasonable to single out an automobile 
2. Row**urf v. Cbrattai, 6$ CaL24 108, 70 CaL 
Bptr. 37> 443 P.2* 535, 32 AJLRM 498 
(1968). 
3. No. 6 at p. 395 o* 206 CftLRpte, DO, 0 at 
p* 21i et 50G P.2& 
4. State 2, *ap*«» 
5. Note I , * * * 
e. Btmm v. Salt Lato Coeaty. 25 Vtnh 2d 
184 41* *M 4M <1STO); Wg*8 v. Woo*. 8 
guest and expose him to greater danger 
from negligence than a paying passenger. 
The fact that the guest paid nothing did 
not provide a reason to excuse the negii* 
gence of the host. 
The court further explained that the 
characterization of the guest's lawsuit a3 
an act of ingratitude had been completely-
eroded by the development of almost uni-
versal automobile liability insurance cover-
age in recent years. Today, the insurance 
company and not the generous host, was 
the recipient of the protection of the guest 
statute. The court was of the opinion that 
the elimination of the guest doctrine would 
in most cases shift the burden of loss from 
the injured individual to the motoring pub* 
lie rather than to the negligent host per-
sonally. The court concluded that the dis* 
criminatory treatment of automobile guests 
could not be upheld against the constitu-
tional attack on the basis of the hospitality 
justification. 
Brown v. Merlo5 is a logical conse-
quence in that jurisdiction, stemming from 
their prior determination to abandon th* 
traditional tort doctrine that the status of a 
person determined the duty owed to him. 
In this jurisdiction the distinction between 
"invitees" or .."business visitors" and "licen-
sees** or "social guests" has been 
preserved6 Thus the classification of an 
automobile guest in Section 41-9-1, U.GA. 
1953, does not single out this one group for 
treatment different than accorded to other 
guests* Likewise, the distinction between a 
paying passenger and an automobile guest 
has been retained in the correlative distinc-
tions between an invitee and licensee. 
Thus, in this jurisdiction, art automobile 
guest has not been isolated from al! other 
guests and recipients of generosity and 
alone denied a duty of due care by his 
host 
As previously noted, the court in Brovrn 
Ve Merlo T relied extensively on Rowland v. 
Christian* to prove the invalidity of th* 
hospitality justification for the guest stat* 
Utak 2d 279, 333 PM 630 (1062) \ Tempi* 
v. RicfcanfeM, 5 Utah- 2d 174, 29& P.2d 124 
(1966{; Hsrvtrd •. DowufA* 112 Utah 508* 
1S9 P.2* 444 (1948). 
7* Not* 1* supptu 
& Xot»2» sap**. 
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ute. This case 13 cited in 32 A.L.R.3d 513, 
as part of the general trend in the field of 
tort laws to eliminate technical status posi-
tions, which had the effect of insulating 
certain classes from liability. In an ex-
planatory footnote,3, it is stated: 
This movement is" probably a result of 
a general shift in the theory of tort law 
from the emphasis on the regulation of 
rights between individuals on the basis 
of relative fault toward a viewpoint 
which regards tort lam as a devic* for 
social engineering, primarily concerned 
with allocation of liability in such a 
manner as to most satisfactorily protect 
the social fabric from the impact of such 
injuries as are a necessary or probable 
consequence of the complicated organiza-
tion of society, [Emphasis added] 
Brown v. Mcrlo, in effect, elevated this 
device for social engineering to the level 
of a constitutional doctrine. First, by this 
device as utilized in Rowland v. Christian, 
the traditional distinction between invitees 
and licensees was nullified, resulting in the 
automobile guest alone being denied the 
duty of ordinary care by his host Second-
ly, to nullify the hospitality justification, 
the court directly incorporated the underly-
ing rationale of social engineering, namely 
that there should be an allocation of liabili-
ty so as to protect the society from the im-
pact of such injuries. The court stated 
that the widespread use of liability insur-
ance shifted all or part of the burden of 
loss from the injured individual to the mo-
toring public Through this process of so-
cial engineering a legislative enactment in 
the area of economics and social welfare 
was thrust into conflict with the modified 
tort doctrine promulgated .by the court 
The court was of the opinion that the stat-
utory classification caused discriminatory 
treatment to automobile guests and violated 
the equal protection guarantees of the Ca!i« 
fornia and United States Constitutions. 
In evaluating the determination of the 
California court that the statute was un» 
constitutkmai, there are two decisions of 
the United State© Supreme Court that sup-
port an opposite conclusion. 
9. FoatBiH % p. 813 Qi » A.UE3& 
tO. 280 UA UT, » S.Ct OTt 74 LJEd. 221 
<1S»). 
In Silver v. Silver,10 the Connecticut 
guest statute was claimed to deny equal 
protection of the law on the ground that it 
distinguished between gratuitous passecv 
gers in automobiles and those in other 
classes of vehicles. The court respond-
ed:1 1 
The use of the automobile as an in* 
strument of transportation is peculiarly 
the subject of regulation. We cannot 
assume that there are no evils to be cor-
rected or permissible social objects to be 
gained by the present statute. We are 
not unaware of the increasing frequency 
of litigation- in which passengers carried 
gratuitously in automobiles, often casual 
guests or licensees, have sought the re-
covery of large sums for injuries alleged 
to have been due to negligent operation 
. . . . Whether there has been se-
.rious increase in the evils of vexatious 
litigation in this class of cases, where 
the carriage is by automobile, is for leg-
islative determination and, if found, may 
well be the basis of legislative action 
further restricting the liability. Its wis* 
dom is not the concern of courts* 
In regard to the alleged discriminatory 
classification, the court stated: ** 
•
 # . there is no constitutional re-
quirement that a regulation, in other re-
spects permissible, must reach every 
class to which it might be applied—that 
the legislature must be held rigidly to the 
choice of regulating all or none. [Cita* 
tions] In this day of almost universal 
highway transportation by motor car, we 
cannot say that abuses originating in the 
multiplicity of suits growing out of the 
gratuitous carriage of passengers in au-
tomobiles do not present so conspicuous 
an example of what the legislature may 
regard as an evil, as to justify legislation 
aimed at it, even though some abuses 
may not be hit (Citations] It is 
enough that the present statute strikes at 
the evil where it is felt, and reaches th* 
class of cases where it most frequently 
occurs. 
tl. At pp. *22-123 of 280 U,S„ at p; 53 of 
50 S.CC 
IZ At pp. 323-14* of 280 TJJ3* at p> 50 of 
60 act Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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A similar interpretation has been recent-
ly set forth in Dandridge v. Williams,13 
wherein the court stated: 
In the area of economics and social 
welfare, a State does not violate the 
Equal Protection Clauie merely because 
the classifications made by its laws are 
imperfect. If the classification has some 
"reasonable basis," it does not oumd the 
Constitution simply because the classifi-
cation "is not made with mathematical 
nicety or because in practice it results in 
some inequality/' [Citation] "The prob* 
lems of government are practical ones 
and may justify, if they do not require, 
rough accommodations—illogical, it may 
be, and unscientific'* [Citation] MA 
statutory discrimination will-not be set 
aside if any state of facts may be con-
ceived to justify it" [Citation] 
* * * • * * 
. . . But the Equal Protection 
Clause does not require that a State 
must choose 'ottwten attacking every as-
pect of a problem or not attacking the 
problem at all. [Citation] It i3 enough 
that the State's action be rationally 
based and free from1 invidious discrimi-
nation . . . . 
The use of the motor vehicle upon the 
public highways has b^tn validly subjected 
to legislative regulation. The presence of 
the guest in this area would itself create a 
basis for a distinct classification from oth-
er guests located where there was no over-
whelming public interest. The motor vehi-
cle exerts a dominant influence in contem-
porary society and its use creates many 
economic and social problems. In a state 
such as Utah a significant portion of our 
economic resources must be devoted to the 
construction and maintenance of highways; 
the economic burden bears a direct rela-
tionship to the number of vehicles and the 
total cumulative mileage on the highways 
each year. The guest statute encourages 
hospitality and directly affects the number 
of vehicles prestnt on the highways, thus 
avoiding traffic congestion and wear to the 
surface! of the roadway. The gues* stat* 
13. S9T (J.& 471, 483, 486-4ST, 90 &£t 
1153, n o . 2* T,iraat 4©i <i970). 
14. *»«•* r. M m , 4 Utafc 2d 3 % 294 P. 
2d 683 (lifii). 
ute promotes the conservation of petroleum 
and other natural resources consumed in 
highway travel. The. suggestion that the 
burden of the injured guest should be 
borne by the motoring public through lia-
bility insurance is an economic and social 
solution that is properly subject to legisla-
tive determination. The Legislature is the 
proper forum to consider the alternative 
solutions for the problem of the injured, 
guest The No. Fault Insurance Act, 31 -
41-1 et $zq.t ILCA. 1953, provides a com* 
promise, the guest receives limiv*d compen* 
sation for injuries, while - hosp*-a!ity is en* 
couraged by not exposing the i ist to un* 
limited liability and staggering insurance 
rates. . The suggested simplistic solution 
that the motoring public should bear the 
costs of the injured guests ignores the eco* 
nomic consequence that increased claim* 
. will be reflected in increased insurance 
rates, creating an -economic hardship on 
the generous host and chilling hospitality. 
[1,2] Section 41-9-1,. U.GA. 1933, was 
enacted to provide some protection to a 
generous host, who is sued, by hi3 invited 
guest for ordinary negligence, when the 
rider has given no compensation as an in-
ducement for making the trip or furnishing 
the carriage for the rider.14 This act sub~ 
served a valid legislative purpose to *n«« 
counige hospitality in the use of th^ public 
highways. Furthermore, the * automobile 
guest in this jurisdiction is not placed in a 
distinct classification, where he alone as a 
recipient of generosity is deprived of the 
duty of due care by his host 
[3] In Brown v. Merlo1-1 the court 
stated that the second justification for the 
guest statute was the prevention of collu-
sive lawsuits. The classification in the 
statute was allegedly predicated on. the 
concept that a driver who gave a fret ride 
to a passenger was motivated by his clos# 
relationship with hia guest, and the driver 
might admit liability to assist the guest in 
collecting from the inruranee company. 
The court rejected thi* rationale ot% the . 
ground that though prior caselaw intra* 
family tort immunity had been rejected 
15. Not* 1* svptft* Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
% # 
The court cited Klein v. Klein l s wherein it 
rejected a claim that the possibility of 
fraudulent lawsuits between a husband and 
wife served as. a sufficient justification to 
bar alt interspousal negligence actions. In 
Hubalcava v. Cisseman,17 thi3 court held 
that a wife may not maintain a tort action 
against her husband or his estate. This 
court declined to follow Klein v. Klein and 
stated that the legislature and not this 
court was the proper forum to change this 
rule. Thus in Utah the guest statute does 
not create a distinct classification for auto-
mobile guests as compared to others insofar 
as collusive lawsuits are concerned. 
The court stated in Brown v. Meriou 
that the numerous statutory exceptions had 
rendered recovery or lack of recovery un-
der the guest statute largely fortuitous and 
added another element of irrationality to 
the statutory scheme. The court explained 
that iht relationship giving rise to liability 
between the driver and occupant might 
fluctuate during the course of a single 
ride, as circumstances brought them within 
and without the language of the statute. 
The court observed that the statute distin-
guished guests on the basis of (1) whether 
or not the journey had come to a momen-
tary halt; (2) whether the guest _ was 
physically located inside or outside the 
car; (3) whether the car was on a pub-
lic highway or private land. The court 
found that these statutory exceptions oper-
ated so illogically as to cause serious ine-
quality and that they did not bear the re-
motest relation to either the objective of 
protecting hospitality or preventing collu-
sive lawsuits. Th*s court concluded that 
under these circumstances, the limiting 
provisions of the statute constituted fur-
ther denial of equal protection. 
In Andrus v. Alired,33 this court stated 
that Section 41-9-1, U.GA.1953, should be 
given a sufficiently practical and reason* 
able application to cover incidents which 
occur as an integral part of the ride. This 
court declined to give the statute such a 
• narrow ami literal interpretation as to 
eliminate incidents which might occur 
18. 53 CaJja m, 29 CalSptt. 102; 378 PJ2d 
70 (IS©). 
17. 14 Utali 24 344, 384 P^d 3 » (1963). 
18. Note 1, rapn. 
while; the vehicle was stopped, however 
briefly and for any purpose. This court 
stated :2d 
It is our opinion that a sensible and 
realistic application of this statute, in 
conforrriity with its objective, requires 
that the protection extend over the entire 
host-guest relationship in connection 
with the giving and taking of the ride. 
. • . the host-guest relationship here 
must also include getting into the car at 
the beginning and getting out of it when 
the ride is completed and any incidents 
which happen in the course of and arising 
out of the ride . . - . 
[4,5] The interpretation of the guest 
statute by this court has averted the al-
leged irrationality in the statutory classifi-
cation which disturbed the court in Brown 
v. Merio, Furthermore, the Equal Protec-
tion Clause does not compel the State to 
attack every aspect of a problem or to re-
frain from any action at all; it is suffi-
cient that the State's action be rationally 
based and free from invidious 
discrimination.21 
The rulings of the trial courts in these 
actions sustaining the constitutionality of: 
Section 41-5-1, U.CA. 1953, are affirmed. 
Costs are awarded to defendants, 
ELLETT and. TUCKETT, JJ., concur. 
HENRIOD, Justice (concurring). 
I concur, except to say that I can see no 
relevancy whatever in the case of Andrus 
v. AH red, cited in the opinion, as to the 
facts or problems involved in the instant 
case. 
CROCKETT, Justice (concurring spe-
cially). 
I am impelled to forswear joining in ex* 
. patiation upon a case of a sister state, 
which we decline to follow anyway. In 
addition to not being binding on us in 
any event, it is decided against a back* 
ground of law significantly different from 
our own, and it impresses me as mainly 
concerned with rationalizations toward * 
19. 17 rtoh 2d 106, 404 J>M 972 (1965). 
20. At p. UO of 37 Utah 2d, at p. 974 o« 404 
P.2d. 
21. DaadrMgo v. Wfflla«% not* 13, sapca. 
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desired result of repudiating their statute. 
Consequently, I desire to state briefly my 
own reasons for refusing to strike down 
our own: 
(1) Our guest statute was enacted by 
the legislature advisedly, to alle-
viate actual abuses which had oc-
. curred, and were occurring.1 
t. See disctreatoa of ja*tiSc*Hoa ol this stat-
ute bas**] on thfr usa of automobit** as such 
• 8u essential and imixjrtaat aspect of irodern 
Jiving that it is au appropriate subject for spe-
cial classification and legislation therioa, and 
tlm salutary pun***** justifying: the statute &$ 
s*t forth by Justic* Worths in Jensen v. 
Mower, 4 Utah 2d 338, 204 P2Ct 683; ami 
se* aba Andrns v. Allwd, IT Ut«h 24 108, 
404 PJM 9TZ 
(2) Although it has not complet-iy 
cured the ills it was aimed at, when 
property applied, it has had the sal-
utary effect of minimizing them. 
(3) It has been in effect for over 40 
years.2 
Inasmuch as it came into being as an ex-
pression of the will of the people through 
legislative enactment, if there is to be any 
such substantial and important chang- in 
the law it should be by that same process, 
and not by judicial pronouncement.3 
2. Originally emuted in Chap. 52, S.UU.1035, 
.3. Se« statement Stanton v. .Stanton, 30 Utah 
2d 315, 517 P.2d 1010, and authorities th«w» 
in cited. 
POINT II 
THE DECEDENT CHILD WAS A GUEST WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE 
UTAH GUEST STATUTE. 
Utah, by decision, in the case of Favatella yf Fouls en« 
403 P. 2d 918, has settled the law in Utah that a child is a 
guest within the meaning of the Utah Guest Statute, said opinion 
being more fully set forth as follows: 
Diane FAVATSI.LA, by and through har 
guardian ad Dtsm, Felix E* FavataHa, 
Plaintiff and R«po»d»»t, 
v. 
Jean W. POULSHN a*d Mary Et!#* Carter, 
DafarrriaifU and App&Nanla* 
No. 10254. 
Supreme Court ctUtah. 
Jul / 7,1985. 
Petition by motorist to dismiss action 
on ordinary negligence brought agaiast her 
by passenger for injuries sustained in coU 
lisioo. The Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Stewart M. Hanson, J., denied the 
petition and the motorist appealed The 
Supreme Court, Henriod, C J., held that 
wherei motorist was driraf a seven-year-
old girl to school, with consent and solicited 
approval o£ parents, and was involved in 
an accident, guest statute precluded passen* 
ger*s rccoverr for injuries sustained. 
Appeal sustained with order to cnt«r 
judgment of no cause of action. 
Automobilss <S=»J81(2> 
Where teacher was driving a seven-
year-old girl to school, with consent and 
solicited approval of parents, and WAS in* 
voWed in an accident, guest statute.pre-
cluded passenger's recovery for injuries 
sustained U . C J U 9 5 3 , 41-9-1. 
Raymond M. Berry, Ernest F, Baldwin, 
Jr., Salt Lake City, for appellants* 
Dwight L King, Salt Lake City, for 
respondent. 
HENRIOD, Chief Justice, 
Interlocutory appeal from an order deny* 
ing defendants* petition to dismiss* The 
appeal is sustained and the trial court i* 
ordered to enter judgment of no cause of 
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action in favor of defendant Carter, with 
no cost; on appeal awarded. 
Carter, a teacher, with the consent and 
apparently solicited approval o£ the parents, 
customarily drove the latters* seven-year-
old girl to school. The teacher was in-
volved in an accident, and the little girl 
was injured. The girl sued, bottoming her 
complaint on ordinary negligence, and it 
was conceded that there was no question as 
to drunkenness or wilful misconduct. Miss 
Carter countered by saying that our "giiesfe" 
statutex precluded recovery. We think 
f. OSfia 41-&-1, Utah Cod* AaaofcUed 1933. 
2. 14 Utah 2d 18, 3T8 P.2d 541 (1962); 
se* ala* H*ar*crfdi r. O. S. L. RK., 70 
Utah 552, 2S2 P. 100 (1927); \Telker 
v. Sorensos, 209 Or. 402, 303 PJ2d 73T 
(1957). 
she is right, as a casual reading of that 
legislation will indicate. 
Plaintiff relies heavily on Smith v. Frank-
lin,- decided by this court recently. A 
casual reading of that case emphasizes its 
complete dissimilarity. 
To espouse -plaintiff's theory of noncon-
sensuality of a minor in the "guest" statute 
sense would be to allow recovery by a 
gestating, unborn, injured infant, where its 
mother, truly a guest, suffers a miscarriage, 
the facts of life of which may have been a 
complete mystery to the Good Samaritan 
host 
MCDONOUGH, CROCKETT, WADE,. 
and CALLISTER, ]J.f concur. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah, by judicial decision, has ruled that the Guest Statute, 
Section 41-9-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is constitutional 
and is not a violation of the Constitution of the United States 
and the Constitution of the State of Utah, and has further 
declared that a child is a guest within the meaning of said 
Guest Statute* 
Respectfullyjiikgiitted, 
/ 48 
X 
ttorne 
48 North Un 
Provo, Utah 
)afendant-Respondent fezaxty Avenue 
84601 
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